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I feel sorry for Professor Yackee. He started a conversation about 
legal employment and ended up in a debate about clinical education.2 
That’s a little like going to a Barry Manilow concert and having Gene 
Simmons walk on to the stage. In fairness, he opened the door to the 
larger issue on direct (perhaps inadvertently) when he acknowledged, 
ever so briefly, that one could “imagine . . . positive consequences of 
skills training,”3 and once the door was opened Professor Findley 
walked through it on cross, to give the conversation a wholly new 
character. As I see it, there now are three questions on the table:  
1) does clinical practice experience improve a law student’s chances of 
getting a legal job, 2) if not, would it if employers were given better 
information about student practice experience, and 3) if not, are there 
other reasons to justify a law school’s decision to fund a clinical 
 
 1. Jason Webb Yackee, Does Experiential Learning Improve JD Employment 
Outcomes?, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 601; Keith A. Findley, Assessing Experiential Legal 
Education: A Response to Professor Yackee, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 627; Robert R. Kuehn, 
Measuring Clinical Legal Education’s Employment Outcomes, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 645. 
 ∗ Professor of Law, the University of Maryland Carey School of Law. 
Work on this article was funded by a grant from the UM Foundation, for which I am 
grateful. Richard Boldt, Molly Brimmer, Christopher Condlin, Steve Ellmann, Sue 
McCarty, Steve Pepe, Michael Pinard, and Charlie Sullivan made many helpful 
improvements to an earlier draft. 
 2. This is true only for the part of the conversation that involves Professor 
Findley. Professor Kuehn responds to Professor Yackee’s empirical claims about legal 
employment. I discuss both topics in Robert J. Condlin, “Practice Ready Graduates”: 
A Millennialist Fantasy, 31 TOURO L. REV. 75, 78–80, 90–93 (2014). Adhering to the 
convention adopted by Professors Yackee and Findley, I will use the terms “clinical 
education” and “experiential education” as synonyms. Yackee, supra note 1, at 602; 
Findley, supra note 1, at 628 n.3. 
 3. Yackee, supra note 1, at 621. 
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program. The answer to question number 1, at least for many private 
law firms (and all of Biglaw), is almost certainly no,4 but there is 
considerable room for disagreement on questions 2 and 3, and I will 
express my views on them shortly. First, however, a few words about 
the ostensible disconnect between clinical practice experience and 
private law firm employment. 
I. DO PRIVATE LAW FIRMS CONSIDER CLINICAL PRACTICE 
EXPERIENCE IN MAKING HIRING DECISIONS? 
More than twenty years ago the MacCrate Task Force reported 
that private law firms did not value clinical practice experience in 
making decisions of whom to hire,5 and Professor Yackee’s study 
suggests that not much has changed in the intervening years.6 His 
attempt to put an empirical punctuation mark on this not entirely 
surprising conclusion7 does not succeed completely, however, because 
he does not consider the full range of variables that might drive the 
legal employment decision and finds only a correlation (or the lack 
thereof) between employment outcomes and clinical practice 
opportunities, not a cause and effect.8 These limitations 
 
 4. Professors Findley and Kuehn argue that this is not true for small and 
medium sized private law firms, government law offices, and public interest 
organizations. See Findley, supra note 1, at 640–42; Kuehn, supra note 1, at 660–61. 
Professor Yackee may agree. See Yackee, supra note 1, at 621. 
 5. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL 
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 6–7 
(1992) (“[F]ew employers appear interested in whether students have enrolled in [skills 
training] courses or how they perform in them.”); id. at 7 n.2 (“The American Bar 
Foundation survey of hiring partners found, for example, that th[e] selection of 
particular courses has little or no impact on hiring decisions.”). 
 6. Not everyone agrees. See, e.g., Neil J. Dilloff, Law School Training: 
Bridging the Gap Between Legal Education and the Practice of Law, 24 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 425, 427–28 (2013) (“[T]hose law schools that are able to turn out 
‘finished’ work-ready graduates will move to the head of the pack, and their graduates 
will have a leg up in this uncertain job market.”). 
 7. Findley, supra note 1, at 627–28 (describing Professor Yackee’s 
“conclusion that higher-ranked law schools are more successful at placing their 
graduates in full-time law-related jobs than are lower-ranked schools,” as “entirely 
unsurprising,” but finding his conclusion “that schools that offer more experiential 
learning opportunities . . . do not have any greater success in placing their students in 
full-time law-related jobs than do schools with fewer clinical offerings” as “less 
obvious[]”). 
 8. Professor Yackee acknowledges these limitations. Yackee, supra note 1, 
at 609 (“There may be any number of other variables that plausibly drive law school 
employment outcomes . . . and I can’t guarantee that the reported results won’t change 
in the face of differently specified models.”); id. at 614 (“The current study has no real 
ability to address issues of causation (as opposed to correlation), and I want to be 
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notwithstanding, his study’s design is inventive and thoughtful, its 
analysis careful and thorough, and its conclusions measured and 
cautious. To paraphrase Daniel Webster, it’s a small study, but it 
makes sense.9 
Cause-and-effect is the gold standard of statistical analysis,10 
however, so it also is not surprising that Professor Kuehn would argue 
that “it is not possible to draw any reliable conclusion” about the 
relationship of clinical practice experience to legal employment from 
Professor Yackee’s study.11 Professor Kuehn’s objections are 
interesting and forcefully argued,12 but in the limited space I have 
 
especially cautious by stressing that I do not claim that the results show that clinical 
opportunities actually hurt student employment outcomes in a causal sense.”). 
 9. For those who did not attend Dartmouth, Webster, in referring to his alma 
mater, said, “It is . . . a small college. And yet there are those who love it!” Daniel 
Webster, Peroration (Mar. 10, 1818), in 3 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: LEGAL 
PAPERS 153, 154 (Andrew J. King ed., 1989). 
 10. One should add, “most of the time.” The issue is different when “big 
data” is involved. There, correlations usually are good enough. See VIKTOR  
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL 
TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 50–72 (2014) (describing how big data 
analysis can be based on correlations or causation, depending upon the questions asked, 
the problems examined, and the objectives pursued). If Professor Yackee’s database 
was bigger, a certain amount of inexactitude in it would not undercut his conclusions. 
Id. at 39 (describing how more data trumps better data); id. at 44–45 (describing how 
“inexactitude [is] invad[ing] one of the areas most intolerant of imprecision: database 
design”); id. at 52 (describing when “[k]nowing what, not why, is good enough”); id. 
at 142 (“From now on . . . princely causation must share the limelight with humble 
correlation.”). 
 11. See Kuehn, supra note 1, at 646. This is reminiscent of the client who 
argues not that he is innocent but that the State cannot prove he is guilty. A 
circumstantial case can be powerful if it makes sense on independent grounds, and 
Professor Yackee’s does. Using Professor Yackee’s model, Professor Kuehn also finds 
a “lack of statistically significant positive associations” between the principal  
non-grade-based indices of law school academic achievement (e.g., law review and 
moot court) and legal employment, though to his credit he would not advise law 
students to be unconcerned about doing well in school. Id. at 655–57 (“[T]he lack of 
statistically significant positive associations should not be read as demonstrating that 
law journal participation does not help a student obtain employment.”). On Professor 
Kuehn’s view, academic achievement of any kind in law school does not correlate in a 
statistically significant way with employment success. This is, at least, counterintuitive. 
 12. To his credit, Professor Kuehn does not just criticize Professor Yackee’s 
study; he makes a positive argument for the role of clinical practice experience in 
securing legal employment. Id. at 660–63. His argument is based principally on lawyer 
and student opinion surveys, however, and it does not take the “telling more than we 
can know” problem endemic to survey research into account. Id.; See Richard E. 
Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports 
on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 231, 255 (1977) (arguing that people 
have “little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes,” i.e., 
how they make decisions, and have access only to the “focus of [their] attention,” 
“current sensations,” and “emotions, evaluations, and plans”). 
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available here I will focus on the issues raised by Professor Findley 
instead. If clinical practice experience is an important part of a law 
student’s education, then it does not matter much if the experience 
helps students get jobs. Jobs will happen. More interesting are the 
questions of whether practice experience should play a role in the hiring 
process, and, if not, whether it nonetheless contributes something of 
value to the development of a lawyer. My answers will be “no” to the 
first question, and “yes” to the second—that most of the time clinical 
practice experience will be more valuable to students than employers. I 
will explain both answers in detail. 
II. WOULD LAW FIRMS CONSIDER CLINICAL PRACTICE EXPERIENCE IN 
MAKING HIRING DECISIONS IF THEY HAD BETTER INFORMATION 
ABOUT IT? 
If private law firms do not take clinical practice experience into 
account in hiring, one might ask, as Professor Findley does,13 why this 
is the case. Professor Yackee suggests that it is because the data is too 
“costly and difficult” to collect,14 but there may be other reasons. For 
one, law firms understandably believe that conventional academic 
credentials (i.e., GPA, class rank, law review) do the best job of 
identifying the smartest students and that the smartest students will 
overcome experience deficiencies quickly and be more productive 
during their entire time at the firm than students with the best practice 
experience, even if this will not always be true the “first day on the 
job.”15 Intelligence differences among law students often are small, of 
course, and one can read more into academic numbers than is 
warranted, but the assumption that students with the best academic 
records will contribute the most over time is reasonable and, as such, it 
is understandable that firms would act on it. 
Sometimes firms are not interested in student practice experience 
because they prefer to do their own training. In-house programs can be 
tailored to a firm’s particular practice and culture, pegged at a higher 
level of sophistication and difficulty than the generic programs offered 
in law schools,16 and taught by experts in the field (who may be 
 
 13. Findley, supra note 1, at 628 (“[W]hy aren’t employers influenced by 
clinical education . . . ?”). 
 14. Yackee, supra note 1, at 603. 
 15. Dilloff, supra note 6, at 430. I assume that the hiring choice is between a 
student with an excellent academic record and a student with an excellent practice 
experience record. A student who excels in both categories will not be at a disadvantage 
simply because he has extensive clinical practice experience. 
 16. As the academy has gotten more and more disconnected from law 
practice, many lawyers seem less trusting of law professors to teach high-level, practice 
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members of the firm). There will be exceptions, of course. A firm 
might value practice experience when it has independent information 
about a candidate’s practice proficiency (e.g., when a student applies 
for a job in the office where he did his clinical practice work), when the 
experience has an immediate job-related benefit (e.g., when the 
student’s experience is with the type of work the firm does itself),17 or 
when the firm does not have the resources or personnel to do its own 
training and having someone else do it is the overriding concern. Most 
of the time, however, practice experience plays second fiddle to 
academic achievement and law school reputation in private law firm 
hiring because smart money bets on talent, not training, and law firm 
money is smart money.18 
Professor Findley argues that firms would take practice experience 
into account if they were given better information about it, and he 
describes several ways in which this could be done.19 In one sense, 
providing more information is not difficult. Law school transcripts 
already disclose student clinical practice coursework, and 
recommendations from practice supervisors could describe the students’ 
levels of practice proficiency. Information of this sort is more costly 
and time consuming to prepare and work with than academic 
transcripts, of course, but when firms think something is important, 
cost usually is not an obstacle. The difficulty with practice-based 
recommendations, however, is that when not perfunctory or boilerplate, 
they often are expressed in overstated language that makes them hard to 
evaluate. Rarely do they describe mistakes, bad judgments, or  
motor-skill errors students made during their practice work, for 
example, notwithstanding the overwhelming probability that such things 
happened, or identify personal qualities that make the students difficult 
to work with or ill-suited for certain types of work. Hyperbole and 
selective reporting in recommendations are easy to understand. In a 
world where most job applicants come described in “better than sliced 
bread” terms, the slightest negative comment could cost a student a job, 
and clinical practice supervisors understandably are reluctant to take 
 
skills. They may continue to have a grudging respect for law professors’ intelligence, 
but they are dismissive of their practical knowledge. 
 17. Public interest organizations, government law offices, and small to 
medium sized firms are the most common examples. See Kuehn, supra note 1, at  
661–62 (describing how public interest organizations, government law offices, and 
small to medium sized firms consider practice experience in hiring). 
 18. It is somewhat of a mystery why firms say they want law schools to do 
skills training but do not take that training into account in hiring. It is as if they prefer 
to do their own training but have someone else pay for it and do not understand how 
those goals contradict one another. 
 19. Findley, supra note 1. 
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that risk. Unfortunately, recommendations designed to equalize the 
playing field in this way often drop out of the hiring process because it 
is difficult to know what they mean. 
There are additional difficulties with practice evaluation data. For 
example, it is easy to compare standardized test scores and grades 
across different schools and students, but there is no easy way to 
compare one student’s practice experience against another’s, no matter 
how scrupulously the experiences are described. More so than 
conventional coursework, the nature, scope, and quality of practice 
instruction vary widely from school to school and course to course.20 
Even in the same course, one student may have limited success in 
managing a set of difficult tasks in complicated cases, while another 
may breeze through a large number of routine tasks in easy cases. The 
practice supervisor may think that the first student is more talented than 
the second, but a recommendation describing the first student’s 
experience, if honest, will report mixed views, while a recommendation 
describing the second student’s experience, equally honest, will report a 
string of unqualified successes, and an employer will not know how to 
compare the two recommendations. 
The “objective” factors Professor Findley lists for comparing one 
practice program against another—“whether clinical faculty have parity 
of status, governance rights, and pay with doctrinal faculty;  
clinical-student teacher ratios; and the like”21—have no necessary, and 
often only a coincidental, connection with the quality of instruction and, 
thus, provide little help in making the needed comparisons. This 
comparative judgment problem exists with traditional law school 
courses as well. An A grade in one Constitutional Law course may 
reflect an entirely different level of understanding and ability than an A 
grade in another Constitutional Law course. But the assumption with 
conventional coursework is that over a law school career a student’s 
overly positive and overly negative grades will even out so that his final 
GPA is likely to be an accurate measure of his overall ability. Clinical 
practice instruction does not provide a big enough sample of work for 
this same assumption to be true for supervisor evaluations. 
These difficulties are exacerbated if one uses clinical grades rather 
than supervisor recommendations to evaluate students. Grading in 
clinical courses varies considerably from course to course and school to 
school. Some clinical courses are not graded, and others are graded on 
 
 20. Findley, supra note 1, at 639 (“[C]linics vary dramatically in content, 
quality, and scope from law school to law school, and even program to program within 
law schools.”); Kuehn, supra note 1, at 651 (“[C]linics across the country, and even 
within schools, vary greatly.”). 
 21. Findley, supra note 1, at 639. 
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a pass/fail basis, but most, at least those taught by full-time clinical 
professors, are graded on the A–F scale used in the traditional 
curriculum,22 and clinical grades often are higher on that scale than 
other law school grades.23 Practice supervisors reward effort and 
improvement as much as level of achievement (it would be hard not to, 
given the closeness of the working relationship), and most clinical 
students work very hard and improve quite a bit. Law students have 
different aptitudes for clinical practice, however, in the same way that 
they have different aptitudes for understanding legal doctrine. Not 
everyone is a natural at interviewing a client, negotiating an agreement, 
or arguing a motion in the same way that not everyone is a natural at 
analyzing a judicial decision, interpreting a text, or evaluating 
competing policies, and because of this, one would expect to see 
roughly the same grade distribution in clinical courses that one sees in 
the rest of the curriculum (if not always in the same order). When this 
does not happen flags are raised, and employers find it difficult to know 
what weight to give the grades. 
Finally, Professor Findley suggests that incorporating evaluations 
of law school clinical programs into the U.S. News & World Report 
(“USNWR”) law school rankings would help employers compare 
practice experience from different schools in the way that the rankings 
help them make the same comparison with traditional coursework.24 At 
the same time, however, he also says that it is not possible for outsiders 
to evaluate the quality of a law school’s clinical program, that only 
insiders can make such judgments.25 But if there are no uniform 
standards for judging the quality of practice instruction across school 
lines, if each clinical program is qualitatively a tub on its own bottom, 
 
 22. Findley, supra note 1, at 637 n.34 (citing ROBERT R. KUEHN & DAVID A. 
SANTACROCE, CTR. FOR STUDY APPLIED LEGAL EDUC., 2013–14 SURVEY OF APPLIED 
LEGAL EDUCATION 21, 24, 32, 35 (2015), http://www.csale.org/files/Report_on_ 
2013-14_CSALE_Survey.pdf). 
 23. Unable to find hard data to support this popular surmise, I emailed a 
dozen friends teaching at other law schools to see if I could corroborate it with gossip. I 
heard back from everyone and, to a person, they said the same thing: that clinical 
grades are higher at their schools, as a rule, than large-class course grades. Most 
added, however, that seminar grades also were higher than large-class grades and 
formed somewhat of a grading bridge between the classroom and the clinic. Whether 
any of this is true as an empirical matter is a question that could be investigated. 
Perhaps Professor Kuehn’s group has done that. 
 24. Findley, supra note 1, at 638–39 (“U.S. News . . . rankings could and 
should be recalibrated to explicitly include quantity, scope, and depth of clinical 
offerings in their overall law school rankings . . . .”). This suggestion assumes that 
USNWR rankings affect law firm perceptions of schools rather than vice versa. 
 25. Findley, supra note 1, at 638 n.37 (“[T]here is no ready way for outsiders 
to assess the quality of any other school’s clinics in a systematic or widespread 
manner.”). 
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then it is not clear how different programs could be compared and 
ranked in USNWR fashion. Ranking requires a uniform standard of 
measurement, and without it there is nothing against which to rank. If 
only an insider can assess the quality of a clinical program, realigning 
the law school rankings to take comparative clinical program data into 
account may turn out to be more difficult than it at first appears. 
For many reasons then—the overstated nature of clinical practice 
evaluations, the uneven quality of clinical practice experiences, the 
availability of more effective in-house training options, the difficulty of 
comparing clinical practice programs from one school to the next, and 
others—it is understandable that private law firms would trust 
conventional academic credentials more than practice experience in 
deciding whom to bring into the firm. 
III. ARE THERE NON–HIRING RELATED REASONS TO JUSTIFY A 
PROGRAM OF CLINICAL INSTRUCTION? 
At the end of his article Professor Yackee offers up a somewhat 
measured paean to clinical education, stating, “Law schools might 
rationally and justifiably invest in skills training to achieve other 
worthwhile goals unrelated to JD employment outcomes.”26 Among 
these other goals, he says, are providing students with “a more 
enjoyable time in law school,” helping students “enter their first job[s] 
with more confidence and less stress,” giving them the opportunity to 
“have a meaningful impact on the lives of the legally underserved,” and 
lessening the risk that they will “commit professional malpractice in 
their first jobs.”27 Because of this, he concludes, 
[E]xperiential learning opportunities certainly have a role to 
play in modern legal education, and perhaps an important 
one. But in deciding how much to spend on providing such 
opportunities, law schools might want to consider the lack of 
evidence that such opportunities are likely to improve their 
graduates’ overall prospects of obtaining a quality job as  
a lawyer. 28 
This is a strange description of the benefits of clinical practice 
instruction. There is nothing in the list, for example, about 
understanding the role of lawyer behavior in implementing statutes and 
doctrines in a fair and just manner, developing a capacity for strategic 
 
 26. Yackee, supra note 1, at 621. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 621–22. 
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“ends-means thinking,”29 learning to live professional lives in both a 
skillful and humane fashion, making legal procedures and institutions 
intelligible and responsive to people caught up in them, or 
understanding the role of substantive legal knowledge and analytical 
skill in professional practice. But Professor Yackee does not stop there. 
He also argues that any “positive consequences of skills training” must 
be measured with “modern empirical methods”30 (which I take to mean 
quantitative methods) before a school can be sure that the benefits of 
such training outweigh its costs.31 Personal and professional 
development can be difficult to measure in quantitative terms, however, 
particularly in young people still forming their professional identities, 
and forcing a program of instruction to justify its existence in a manner 
that does not fit its objectives or circumstances can be a sub rosa way 
of scuttling the program. One gets the sense that Professor Yackee is 
not a fan of clinical education, his proffers of agnosticism 
notwithstanding,32 though that may be just me indulging nostalgically in 
a lost paranoia. 
Professor Findley’s response to these suggestions takes us full 
force into the clinical education debate. This is an old debate and not a 
simple one. Its opening arguments go back to the 1930s, and its 
subsequent remarks continue unabated to the present day.33 Professor 
Findley’s article, while short, raises too many issues to be discussed in 
the limited space I have here, so I will restrict my comments to his 
most prominent points. His principal argument, based on what he 
describes as “effective pedagogy for adult learners,”34 goes back to the 
 
 29. Professor Amsterdam usually is given credit for identifying this as one of 
the subjects of clinical practice instruction. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal 
Education—A 21st-Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 614 (1984) (defining 
“[e]nds-means thinking” as “the process by which one starts with a factual situation 
presenting a problem or an opportunity and figures out the ways in which the problem 
might be solved or the opportunity might be realized”). 
 30. Yackee, supra note 1, at 621. 
 31. Upping the ante, Professor Yackee also seems to say that examining the 
question quantitatively is the only “rational” way to proceed. Id. Though, in fairness, 
he adds that modern empirical methods should be used only “to the extent possible.” 
Id. 
 32. Id. (“None of this is to say that skills education is necessarily  
wasted money.”). 
 33. See Condlin, supra note 2, at 76 n.4 (describing the history of the clinical 
education debate). Professor Kuehn describes “[c]linical training [as] one of the most 
significant developments in legal education over the last century.” Kuehn, supra note 1, 
at 645. Perhaps, but if that were true we would not still be debating its worth today. 
See Condlin, supra note 2, at 103–12 (describing the developments in legal education 
over the last century in the section entitled “Why Skills Instruction Has Always Been a 
Hard Sell in the Legal Academy”). 
 34. Findley, supra note 1, at 629. 
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1970s. Adults, he argues, comprehend, retain, and recall cognitive 
material best when they actively engage in resolving real-life, concrete 
problems that ask them to change their social role and reflect on and 
assess their resolution of those problems as part of a process of mutual 
inquiry by teacher and student.35 He describes this argument as based 
on “sound pedagogy and intellectual rigor,”36 and, in what probably is 
his most provocative statement, says, “Clinical education meets th[e] 
needs [of adult learners] in ways that traditional classroom education 
simply cannot.”37 
This last point seems demonstrably false, even on Professor 
Findley’s own terms. Take the example of classroom case analysis. In 
analyzing cases, students identify and evaluate decision rationales, 
parse ambiguous and confusing language, look for reasoning errors and 
evidentiary gaps, identify and evaluate relevant policy considerations, 
and reconcile other cases on the same subject, all in an intellectually 
“active” and “engage[d]” manner.38 Analyzing cases in this way is a 
“real-life experience[],”39 requiring students to solve “concrete 
problems”40 of the type they are likely to confront in actual law 
practice, and one that involves them in “chang[ing] . . . [their] social 
roles”41 (from student to lawyer). In discussing their interpretations 
with others, students also “reflect upon”42 their resolutions as part of a 
process of “mutual inquiry”43 with teachers and classmates. Case 
analysis differs from clinical practice instruction only in what is 
learned, not how it is learned,44 pedagogically, the two processes are 
 
 35. Id. at 631. 
 36. Id. at 633. 
 37. Id. at 631. Professor Findley says this notwithstanding that generations of 
adult learners, presumably including him, have been educated successfully in 
classrooms. 
 38. Id. (quoting Frank I. Michelman, The Parts of the Whole: Non-Euclidean 
Curricular Geometry, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 352, 353 (1982)). 
 39. Id. (quoting Kimberly E. O’Leary, Evaluating Clinical Law Teaching—
Suggestions for Law Professors Who Have Never Used the Clinical Teaching Method, 
29 N. KY. L. REV. 491, 495 (2002)). 
 40. Id. (quoting Michelman, supra note 38, at 353–54). The “problem” in 
case analysis is figuring out what a case means and how it can be used. This is a subset 
of the larger “problem” of determining what can be done for the client, but it is a 
problem nonetheless, and solving it, and analytical problems like it, is a precondition to 
practicing successfully. Clinical (and legal bargaining) scholars sometimes write as if 
only they were the only ones to “solve problems.” 
 41. Id. (quoting Frank S. Bloch, The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal 
Education, 35 VAND. L. REV. 321, 334 (1982)). 
 42. Id. (quoting O’Leary, supra note 39, at 495). 
 43. Id. (quoting Bloch, supra note 41, at 333). 
 44. All skills, analytical as well as motor, are learned in basically the same 
way: by observation, imitation, critique, and repetition. For a description of the 
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the same.45 This should not be surprising since all skills learning, of 
whatever kind, is “experiential,” “hands-on,” and “problem solving.”46 
The problems and experiences vary, and sometimes the hands are on 
different things, but the process through which skills are learned is 
always the same. Why clinicians continue to argue for a pedagogical 
divide between the classroom and the clinic is one of the enduring 
mysteries of the clinical education debate.47 
Professor Findley makes a “Fourth Amendment” argument that 
illustrates another dimension of this point.48 After asserting that clinical 
instruction “deepen[s] students’ understanding of substantive material 
by providing a context [with which] to help them understand doctrine 
more deeply,”49 he adds, students “inevitably gain a fuller 
understanding [of Fourth Amendment doctrine] when they try to solve 
problems for real clients.”50 He probably does not intend the second 
half of this statement to mean that clinical instruction is the only means 
by which to gain a full understanding of Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
That would suggest that Akhil Amar, Dan Capra, Tom Davies, Wayne 
LaFave, Arnold Loewy, Chris Slobogin, and many other well-known 
Fourth Amendment scholars do not have a “full[] understanding”51 of 
the Fourth Amendment, since none of them, so far as I can tell, has 
represented a “real client[]”52 in the sense Professor Findley seems to 
use the term. Whatever one thinks of the views of these scholars, there 
 
psychological and philosophical premises underlying this conception of skill learning, 
see Condlin, supra note 2, at 92–93. 
 45. I first said this in 1981. See Robert J. Condlin, Socrates’ New Clothes: 
Substituting Persuasion for Learning in Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 MD. L. REV. 
223, 225 n.3 (1981) (“[R]ecognized role-taking, learning grounded in student 
experience, and the use of role adjustment tensions to motivate are [not] new with or 
distinctive to clinical study. [They] also describe most of the pedagogy of the first year 
of law school . . . .”). Professor Findley quotes me as saying more recently that “[t]he 
distinctive feature of [clinical instruction] is its ability to confront its subject both 
methodologically and substantively: to analyze skills while actually using them.” 
Findley, supra note 1, at 632 n.13 (quoting Condlin, supra note 2, at 91). He is correct 
about that. I did say it. But as the above discussion illustrates, I was wrong. Clinical 
practice instruction proceeds in the way I described, but classroom case analysis does as 
well, and it was a mistake for me to say that the process is “distinctive” to clinical 
instruction. I hope no one relied on my assertion to her or his detriment. 
 46. Findley, supra note 1, at 630. 
 47. I realize that Professor Findley is no longer a clinician, but the pedagogy 
argument has been a staple of the defense of clinical education from the earliest days. 
He is not the first to use it. 
 48. Findley, supra note 1, at 634. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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is no denying that their understanding of the Fourth Amendment is 
“deep[]”53 and genuine. Professor Findley must mean only that 
representing clients can add nuance, sophistication, and depth to 
doctrinal understanding, not that representing clients is a prerequisite to 
a full understanding of doctrine in the first instance, but even that is 
true only some of the time, for reasons I will explain shortly. 
Professor Findley continues his Fourth Amendment argument with 
an analogy to medical education. “Imagine,” he says, “the medical 
school that sought to teach anatomy by having students read about it 
and discuss it without allowing them to experience the human body 
through hands-on exploration.”54 Medical education analogies also have 
been a staple in the argument for clinical legal education from the 
earliest days, but the differences between law and medicine have made 
most of them non-starters. Take Professor Findley’s anatomy analogy 
as a case in point. Fourth Amendment doctrine is principally a body of 
ideas—rules, policies, and principles—not a physical body, and a body 
of ideas is understood intellectually more than through “hands-on” 
contact. Practice instruction can teach students to manipulate Fourth 
Amendment doctrine (learned in the classroom) to advance client ends, 
but using doctrine in a self-interested manner is not the same as 
understanding doctrine in the first instance. Under some circumstances, 
in fact (e.g., when it causes one to believe that law is infinitely 
malleable because there are always “cases on both sides”),55 it can 
make genuine understanding less likely. 
In the end, the case for clinical education needs substantive 
arguments, not pedagogical ones, to silence the naysayers. What new 
skills, bodies of knowledge, values, perspectives on the world, theories 
of justice, and the like (subject matters, in effect) do students learn in 
clinical courses that they do not (or cannot) learn in conventional law 
school courses, and why is it important that law students learn these 
things?56 Until these questions are answered, the debate over clinical 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Robert J. Condlin, “Cases on Both Sides”: Patterns of Argument in 
Legal Dispute-Negotiation, 44 MD. L. REV. 65, 65–66 (1985) (describing the law 
student belief “that legal argument never convinces anyone” because “[t]here are cases 
on both sides”). 
 56. Professor Findley makes an argument of this sort when he claims that 
clinical practice instruction teaches types of reasoning not found in the traditional 
classroom, and lists “[e]nds-means thinking,” “[h]ypothesis formulation and testing,” 
and “decisionmaking [under uncertainty]” as examples. Findley, supra note 1, at 633 
(quoting Amsterdam, supra note 29, at 614). Of the three, only a certain kind of  
ends-means thinking is not a prominent part of classroom case analysis, however, and 
for understandable reasons. Representing a client starts with an understanding of the 
client’s ends and reasons backwards to identify the best means for achieving them. 
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education is not likely to end. People may get tired of it for periods of 
time, and it may go into temporary remission, but as the recent 
paroxysm over “practice ready graduates” demonstrates, inevitably it 
will flare up and rekindle old conflicts.57 Suggestions of how to answer 
these questions are out there,58 and the questions themselves seem 
manageable, but, for one reason or another, many (but not all)59 of 
those who write about clinical education seem to prefer discussions of 
“Best Practices”60 to discussions of legal and political theory, and this 
reinforces the view that clinical practice instruction is about little more 
than technique. 
Professor Findley also argues that “the ABA is prodding law 
schools toward experiential learning because it is good for the 
profession—that is, it provides value independent of a competitive 
hiring advantage for some schools or some graduates.”61 No doubt, 
Professor Findley understands ABA politics better than I, but even I 
realize that the Association represents the interests of a mixed bag of 
constituents, under the influence of a mixed bag of personalities, and 
for a mixed bag of reasons. Clinicians have looked to the ABA for 
leverage in their struggles with traditional law faculty from the earliest 
days. Those early efforts were couched in the rhetoric of providing 
legal services to the poor, but since the poor had limited political clout 
these efforts often met with limited success. As economic conditions in 
 
Analyzing a case proceeds in the opposite direction, reasoning forward from the case’s 
factual and legal premises to understanding its conclusion. Case analysis involves 
instrumental reasoning, of course, but of a different sort than the instrumental reasoning 
used in client representation. The two other types of reasoning listed by Professor 
Findley are as much a part of case analysis as they are of clinical practice. In analyzing 
a case one constructs different interpretations of what the case could mean (i.e., forms 
“hypotheses”), “tests” those interpretations by comparing them against the case’s text 
and the views of others, and “makes a decision” about which interpretation to adopt, 
subject to reconsidering it if told something new (i.e., under conditions of 
“uncertainty”). Id. As with Professor Findley’s earlier “adult learner” argument, see 
supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text, rumors of the pedagogical differences 
between the classroom and clinic have been greatly exaggerated. 
 57. See Condlin, supra note 2. 
 58. See id. at 109–12 (describing subject matter–based justifications for 
clinical practice instruction). 
 59. See id. (describing legal- and political theory–based discussions of clinical 
practice). 
 60. See, e.g., ROY STUCKEY & OTHERS, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. ASS’N, BEST 
PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007). A follow up book, BUILDING ON BEST 
PRACTICES: TRANSFORMING LEGAL EDUCATION IN A CHANGING WORLD (Deborah 
Maranville et al. eds., 2015), is available for free from the LexisNexis store at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/store/catalog/booktemplate/productdetail.jsp?pageName= 
relatedProducts&skuId=sku-us-ebook-03393-epub&catId=cat-US-ebook-epub& 
prodId=prod-us-ebook-03393-epub. 
 61. Findley, supra note 1, at 630. 
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law practice worsened, however, and law firms began to recognize the 
value of transferring new lawyer training costs to law schools, the 
political clout behind the ABA’s support for clinical education 
strengthened appreciably. No doubt some in the Association have 
educational goals in mind in pressuring law schools to provide more 
practice instruction, but a close reading of the Association’s reports on 
the subject, particularly the recent Report and Recommendations from 
the ABA’s Task Force on the Future of Legal Education, makes it clear 
that economic concerns also are at the heart of the matter.62 
Finally, I have a small objection to rhetorical style. Like a lot of 
clinical scholarship, Professor Findley’s case for the value of practice 
instruction frequently draws on evocative buzzwords more than fully 
developed arguments for its substantive support. For example, he says 
that practice instruction develops the capacity for “life-long 
learn[ing]”63 without describing the attributes of life-long learning or 
saying how it is measured and that clinical instruction produces 
“reflective practitioners”64 without saying what “reflection” consists of 
or how it is different from the law school–wide experience of 
reconsidering views when they are challenged or questioned.65 
Similarly, when he uses the term “clinical education” (and its cognates) 
he usually pairs it with adjectives such as “sound,”66 “deep,”67 
“important,”68 and “uniquely powerful”69 as if the adjectives were part 
of the noun. To an unsympathetic reader all of this can look like 
 
 62. See TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., AM. BAR ASS’N, 
REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 16 (2014) (In the second half of the twentieth 
century, “[t]he legal profession increasingly began to assign, or to try to assign, more 
responsibility to law schools for the practical and business aspects of the education of 
lawyers, mainly for economic reasons.”). 
 63. Findley, supra note 1, at 629. 
 64. Id. 
 65. “Reflection” has become somewhat of a clinical mantra over the years, 
used to describe a wide variety of things (and sometimes nothing at all), and it would be 
interesting to know more about Professor Findley’s understanding of the term. I believe 
the concept has meaning and have written about it at length myself, see Robert J. 
Condlin, Learning From Colleagues: A Case Study in the Relationship Between 
“Academic” and “Ecological” Clinical Legal Education, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 337,  
357–60 (1997) (describing “learning mode” behavior), and 374–414 (case studies 
illustrating learning mode behavior in operation), but I doubt Professor Findley is 
piggybacking on my work. 
 66. Findley, supra note 1, at 629 (“sound pedagogy”). 
 67. Id. at 633 (“Understood properly, the argument for clinical education is 
that it is an important component of a full and deep legal education . . . .”). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 634 (“Among other things, clinics teach, in uniquely powerful 
ways, about the importance of facts and the interrelationship between facts and  
law . . . .”). 
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question-begging argument under the guise of description, and reinforce 
the suspicion that the case for clinical education is based on jargon as 
much as reasons and evidence. Professor Findley’s arguments would 
lose none of their force if he deleted this language. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the tradition in this country to end on a positive note, so I 
should say in closing that I believe clinical practice instruction is an 
indispensable part of a complete legal education. Like Professor 
Findley, I began my teaching career as a clinician and moved to the 
dark side only later in life. I taught practice courses for a little over ten 
years and simulation-based skills courses for another thirty, in cities of 
various sizes; for public and private law schools; out of neighborhood 
legal services offices, private law firms, a public interest backup 
center, a large university’s student legal services office, and a 
government law office; in large classes and small seminars; and in 
packages ranging from fifteen hours of credit for one semester to one 
hour of credit for independent study. I believe in the value of clinical 
education because I believe what law delivers is as important as what it 
promises, and clinical education, at its best, teaches students how to 
deliver on law’s promises.70 On the other hand, I also believe that 
practice instruction should not be the dominant part of a law school 
curriculum or play a larger role than it does in most schools at the 
present time.71 Its content is too uneven, episodic, and situation-driven 
to be a complete program of instruction for even the study of lawyer 
practice skills, and becoming a lawyer involves much more than 
learning lawyer practice skills. In the end, the ultimate practice skill is 
the ability to think critically from an informed legal, practical, and 
 
 70. I discuss this issue in greater detail in Condlin, supra note 2, at 109–12. 
 71. It is difficult to generalize about the role of clinical programs in different 
schools because the size and nature of the programs vary greatly from place to place. 
Consequently, my comments are not intended to refer to any particular schools, 
including my own. The ABA is of a different mind on this issue, and thinks clinical 
instruction should play a larger role than it does in most places. See TASK FORCE ON 
THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note 62, at 3 (“The balance between doctrinal 
instruction and focused preparation for the delivery of legal services needs to shift still 
further toward developing the competencies and professionalism required of people who 
will deliver legal services to clients.”). Recently, it has translated this sentiment into an 
accreditation standard. ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF 
LAW SCHS. Std. 303(a)(3) (2014–15) (“A law school shall offer a curriculum that 
requires each student to satisfactorily complete at least . . . (3) one or more experiential 
course(s) totaling at least six credit hours.”). 
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social perspective,72 and teaching students to think this way (and 
transmitting the body of knowledge on which such thinking is based) is 
the work of all law professors, traditional and clinical alike. Most law 
faculties have divided that task effectively for a very long time, and I 
would not mess with those arrangements except in extreme 
circumstances. I also would leave it to others to define extreme. 
 
 72. This is true for all types of work. The legendary Marine Corps General 
James “Maddog” Mattis made the same point in discussing military combat. He said, 
“The most important six inches on the battlefield is between your ears.” Geoffrey 
Ingersoll & Paul Szoldra, 19 Unforgettable Quotes from Retiring General James ‘Mad 
Dog’ Mattis, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 23, 2013, 10:31 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/general-maddog-mattiss-best-quotes-2013-1#the-most-
important-six-inches-on-the-battlefield-is-between-your-ears-11. 
